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    A “canon” is a set of writings generally regarded as the most authoritative, important, or well-executed 
of their kind. When law teachers speak of a “canon,” they usually mean a standard set of cases that forms 
the basis of an acceptable curriculum in their field. We teach our subjects from the canon. In my field, 
Constitutional Law, its principal members include Marbury, Gibbons, McCulloch, Youngstown, and 
Brown. 
    In an important article, Professor Jamal Greene identified a Constitutional Law “anticanon,” composed 
of cases regarded as the Supreme Court’s worst: Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu. He thought 
the anticanon posed a special problem for teachers of Constitutional Law. Unlike, say, English literature, 
in law we teach from the anticanon as well as from the canon. Since we are teaching “professional 
competence,” which in Constitutional Law consists in an ability to tell good from bad constitutional 
arguments, there is a temptation to explain the status of anticanonical opinions by identifying their 
argumentative defects. But the cases of the anticanon, it turns out, do not necessarily exhibit obvious 
“analytic errors.” Rather, Professor Greene argued, each case has earned its membership in the 
anticanon because of “the attitude the constitutional interpretive community takes toward the ethical 
propositions that the decision has come to represent.” 
    Of course, attitudes change. Much of Professor Greene’s article was devoted to tracing the route of 
various cases into, and out of, the anticanon. There may be more than one interpretive community, as 
well. Different communities may have different attitudes about a case, and their relative status can affect 
the status of the case. In 2016, for example, a supporter of presidential candidate Donald Trump 
suggested on television that Korematsu could provide legal support for creating a “Muslim registry.” 
Publicly embracing the case may have just been “trolling,” or it may have been an effort to push the case 
out of the anticanon. (Notably, in Trump v. Hawaii, decided two years later, the Supreme Court appeared 
to disavow Korematsu, en route to upholding the President’s statutory power to exclude broad classes of 
individuals from entering the United States). 
    Another source of change is in the attitudes of law teachers towards the Constitution itself. Over the 
last several decades a series of trenchant historical studies have exposed the depth of interconnection 
between the patriots of the American revolution and the system of race slavery that had developed in 
the colonies and in which some of the revolutionaries participated as plantation masters or agents. 
These slaver-patriots were frightened by judicial decisions like Somerset v. Stewart (1772), which held 
slavery unlawful under the law of England, and which some historians have described as provoking a 
firestorm in the American colonies. American efforts to ensure their “security of property” against 
English interference were really efforts, at least in part, to preserve human bondage. Other works have 
shown the agency of black men and women in seeking their own freedom, sometimes by joining the 
loyalist cause. One commentator recently suggested that the preservation of race slavery was the 
Revolution’s defining issue. The claim is controversial, but that the interests of a significant portion of 
America’s political elite were bound up with the slave system and that they retained these interests at 
the time of the Constitution’s framing are easy to prove. The text of the Constitution famously protects 
the slave trade from federal interference for 20 years, guarantees the return of escapees, and enhances 
the political influence of slave states by counting 3/5 of "all other persons,” alongside their free persons, 
in apportioning seats in the national legislature. But the interests of the elite in slavery were more than 
economic. Enslavement was intensely personal, and intimacy, fear, and violence were intertwined in the 
master-slave relationship. Professor Annette Gordon-Reed's painstaking studies, having finally made 
plain Thomas Jefferson’s relationship with his slave Sally Hemings, with whom he had a number of 
children, must now form an essential part of our understanding of the man. This important research, 
along with much else like it, seems finally to have registered in broader social attitudes. Among law 
teachers, at least, the liberal orthodoxy of Constitution- and framer-worship, born in America’s post-war, 
mid-century glow, appears to be over. 
    As attitudes about the Constitution change, the very roles of the constitutional canon and anticanon 
seem to be changing as well. If, as was sometimes said of the Trump administration’s immigration 
policy, “the cruelty was the point”—if the Constitution was intended to entrench a slave system and the 
social practice of race subordination and violence that underwrote it, then Dred Scott looks much less 
like a painful aberration and more like a foundational principle. It may still trigger our revulsion, but it 
now acquires the claim to a central place in our class. To tell the story of American constitutional law, 
one should begin from Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu. It is the cases of the anticanon, not the canon, 
that form the basis of an acceptable curriculum. That they do not contain any obvious “analytic errors” is 
now explainable and makes the revision easier to carry out. That the language of these opinions may be 
offensive, corrosive, injurious or even traumatic for students is essential and it cannot be ignored 
(remember, “the cruelty is the point”). In these ways, the anticanon becomes the canon. Where does this 
leave the old canon? The awkward errors in some of the canonical cases, such as Marbury, can now be 
openly admitted. They were products of a need to supply the pretext for judicial action. In other cases, 
like Brown, the failure of the Supreme Court to achieve its grand objectives looks grimly predictable. 
Brown’s prospects ultimately rested on the superficial, self-regarding integrationist impulses of what 
one journalist has called “nice white parents,” who eventually proved unwilling to share resources with 
black pupils and black teachers, or to cede control to black parents. 
    I call this transformation the “anti-canonization” of Constitutional Law. What does it mean for the 
teaching and practice of Constitutional Law? In another article, Professor Greene described an attitude 
he called “constitutional optimism,” which he associated with the ideas of constitutional redemption, 
progress, and faith developed by other writers. The optimistic attitude had little concrete legal value, he 
thought, but it did give “constitutional support to political imagination.” Professor Greene suggested this 
kind of support might be necessary for constitutional government to survive. 
    Does constitutional optimism require ignoring the anticanon? “Cancelling” it? Is optimism consistent 
with anti-canonization? How can we responsibly teach constitutional optimism? Is it possible to give the 
anticanon its due place in our curriculum, while teaching a version of Constitutional Law that inducts 
students into a practice of optimism, as may be necessary to sustain our system of limited government? I 
don’t think we know the answers to these questions, but I do think they are serious questions. 
    How many doses of reality can we give our students? An unrelenting emphasis on the 
disappointments of the system will invite the students to draw a normative inference about the system 
itself. The point is not that our students are pessimistic or “fragile,” that they are unable to deal with 
disappointment in discovering the truth; this framing implies a need to develop their resistance to 
disappointment, a kind of mental toughness or “grit.” It may be, however, that what they need is not 
toughness, but reason for hope, and the energy and determination that feed on hope. The anticanon has 
an essential role to play in generating this response, as a stimulant for justice, and it has an essential 
pedagogical role to play in explaining the evolution of legal doctrine and the American constitutional 
system. But at too great a dosage it poisons, robbing students of the optimism and self-respect necessary 
to maintain the project of constitutional governance at all. How can a teacher invite young lawyers to 
participate in a system, to take ownership of it, to assert their position as leaders within it, to make their 
own great use of it, if their only view of the system is its exclusion and subordination of people like 
them? 
 
